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Abstract 
This paper examines the development of employment policy in the United Kingdom 
leading to the creation of the Young Person’s Guarantee and its main component, the 
Future Jobs Fund. Past public-sector direct employment schemes, including those 
associated with the workfare model, had been discredited as ineffective across the 
OECD. In numerous countries, however, newer job creation schemes were implemented 
from the 1990s, aimed at addressing some of the shortcomings of earlier projects, and 
utilizing the growth of smaller community-based projects – the Intermediate Labour 
Markets, or ILMs. Whilst there was no strategic policy commitment to demand-led active 
labour market policy in the UK until recent years, a network of ILMs came into existence, 
and much of the funding for these small-scale local projects came from the government. 
With the onset of the current economic downturn, and the substantial rise in cyclical 
unemployment, policy-makers more closely examined options for a demand-led strategy. 
Although ILMs had not been created with a view to forming part of an ‘employer of last 
resort’ policy, and were generally directed at very specific groups, the potential of these 
schemes to form part of a wider national strategy was clearly seen. In 2009 the 
government announced a job guarantee for all young people, primarily through the 
Future Jobs Fund. This initiative was inspired by ‘employer of last resort’ (or ‘job 
guarantee’) concept and the work of Hyman Minsky, and the intention was to extend it 
over time. Although the Future Jobs Fund was scrapped in May 2010 following a change 
of government in the UK, it incorporates the lessons of past policy failures, representing 
a bold step in active labour market policy – and may form a model for reviving demand-
led employment policy.  
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Introduction 
The late Michael Foot, who led the British Labour Party for three years in the early 
1980s, once wrote the following words about the social impact of long-term 
unemployment, as he witnessed it during the Great Depression (Foot, 1984): 
I saw mass unemployment as the most fearful curse which could befall our 
people – breaking a man’s faith in his craft, breaking a woman’s right to her own 
life, breaking whole families, turning children against their parents, and parents 
against their children. Yes, that is what is was like in those far-off days when the 
community did so pitifully little to help those hardest hit, when the means test with 
all its sophisticated ways of torturing poor people was in full rigourous application, 
when long-term unemployment for more than a million of our citizens meant lives 
smashed for ever.  
And yet, incredibly, there was something even worse than the mass 
unemployment and all its associated outrages. It was the tale we were told by our 
rulers throughout that whole epoch. What was it they said? There is no 
alternative. (pp. 46-47) 
Michael Foot evokes here the sense of waste and the social trauma of mass 
unemployment – and illustrates a keen sensitivity to what has historically been a key 
issue for the Labour Party. Foot belonged to a past generation of Labour leaders, but the 
question of employment has not lost any of its salience for the party that he once led. As 
recently as July 2009, the New Labour policy advisor and writer Paul Richards wrote 
(Richards, 2009):  
Outrage at mass unemployment forms part of Labour’s folk-memory. The 
memory of the means test, soup kitchens, and men idling on street corners were 
strong reasons to vote Labour in 1945. In the 1980s, with three million on the 
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dole, unemployment dominated popular culture and politics… It was the time of 
the Peoples’ March for Jobs, dole queues, and UB40 in the charts. 
Early on in the current downturn, the alarming rise in the claimant count caused serious 
concern within the last Labour government in its final years in office, and a determination 
not to repeat the failures of past recessions. New policy options were examined and new 
solutions sought after. 
British Employment Policy 1945 - 1997 
Ensuring full employment formed part of the economic consensus that dominated British 
politics in the three decades following World War II. This consensus was based broadly 
along the lines set out by thinkers such as John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge, 
who set out the rationale and theoretic underpinnings for a full employment policy, in 
terms of macro-economic demand management. In his book Full Employment in a Free 
Society, Beveridge (1944) summed up the argument for state intervention to ensure full 
employment, in the light of the experience of the wartime economy: “The experience of 
war is relevant to peace: that unemployment disappears and that all men have value 
when the State sets up unlimited demand for a common purpose… securing full 
employment by socialization of demand without socialization of production (p.29).” 
Moreover he formulated a definition of full employment which is more favourable to 
workers than anything previously used:  
It means having always more vacant jobs than unemployed men, not slightly 
fewer jobs. It means that the jobs are at fair wages, of such a kind, and so located 
that the unemployed men can reasonably be expected to take them; it means, by 
consequence, that the normal lag between losing one job and finding another will 
be very short (p.18) 
 The Labour Party, which governed Britain in the years immediately following the war 
(1945-1951) and then for part of the 1960s and 1970s, based its employment policy 
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along the lines of what became accepted as standard Keynesian economics, viz. to fine 
tune the economy using the instruments of monetary and fiscal policy – with incomes 
policies serving as the primary tool for controlling inflation. Wickham-Jones (2001) 
explained that whilst Labour policy makers were aware of the active labour market 
policies that were implemented in countries such as Sweden, and exchanges with 
Swedish Social Democrats did take place, Keynesian demand management coupled 
with incomes policies held sway during this period and policies to support training 
facilities were seen in terms of promotion of faster economic growth rather than of 
employment. Reasons given by Wickham-Jones for this attachment to macro-economic 
fine-tuning and rejection of active labour market policies along Scandinavian lines are 
various and include the insularity of policy-making processes within the Labour Party 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the relatively weak centralized structures of trade union as 
well as employer umbrella organisations, and what was seen as a potential weakening of 
the traditional role of trade unions as workforce representatives in the specific workplace 
context. 
The bipartisan political commitment to maintaining full employment did not survive the 
turbulent 1970s and the rise of monetarism, and was definitively abandoned when the 
Thatcher government took office in 1979. The new economic priority was to control 
inflation, with employment very much a lesser concern, and it was now believed to be 
undesirable and counterproductive to aspire to a rate of unemployment below the 
NAIRU, the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment. With the return of 
classical economic theories, mass unemployment came to be rationalized, as it was in 
the decades before the Second World War (Glynn, 1999), and also turned out to be 
acceptable for a sufficient part of the electorate for the Conservatives to remain in power 
for almost two decades. But it was not until the 1990s, and after four electoral defeats, 
that Labour began to change its stance on employment, adopting the greater part of the 
new economic consensus, whilst retaining a commitment to dealing with the problem of 
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high unemployment, especially amongst young people, in keeping with the party’s 
traditional concern with this issue. The thinking of Labour policy makers was also 
influenced by growing evidence of the severe lasting consequences of long-term 
unemployment, including on health (Gregg, 2009). The new policy entailed a move away 
from Keynesian aggregate demand management and a greater interest in supply-side 
labour market policy, guided by the view that the level of the NAIRU in the United 
Kingdom could be reduced to a lower level (Finn, 2003). A central aspect of this new 
policy direction, which coincided with the rebranding of the party as ‘New Labour’, was 
the recognition of the importance of work to the relief of poverty and to the functioning of 
the welfare state. A key plank in the ‘Third Way’ philosophy espoused by New Labour 
was the reform and modernization of the welfare state – neither a return to socialistic 
principles of the past, nor reducing the welfare state to a bare minimum (Fraser, 2003). 
This broadly matches views that were held in other European countries, regarding the 
importance of high levels of employment to maintaining the European social model and 
the key role of the transition to paid employment as a route out of poverty (Daguerre & 
Etherington, 2009). 
The New Deal initiatives 
The Labour Party returned to office in 1997 committed to retaining the revamped benefits 
regime instituted by the outgoing Conservative government in 1996. Under this new 
system the Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) replaced previous benefits and involved stricter 
conditions on the unemployed (Finn, 2003). However the JSA was to be supplemented 
by a series of active labour market policies under the title of ‘New Deal’ which were 
implemented over the course of several years. The New Deal initiatives were financed by 
a £5 billion ‘windfall tax’ on the utility companies which had been privatized under the 
Conservatives (Finn, 2003). The first of these initiatives, the New Deal for Young People, 
was targeted at the under-25 age group, and involved a ‘gateway’ period of job search 
advice and skills training. ‘Clients’ were allocated to a personal advisor and required to 
7 
Future Jobs Fund 
attend regular meetings (Lowe, 2005).  After the gateway period, clients who had not 
succeeded in finding unsubsidized employment were obliged to take up one of four 
options: subsidized work, participation in training or education, work on an environmental 
task force, or self-employment (Gregg, 2009). The withdrawal of benefits was used as a 
sanction for those refusing all of these options. Altogether there were five further New 
Deal policies and they were focused on preparing individuals mired in long-term 
unemployment to return to the job market: The New Deal for Long-term Unemployed, the 
New Deal for Lone Parents, the New Deal for Disabled People, the New Deal for 
Partners of Unemployed and the New Deal for the 55+ (Daguerre, 2004).  In addition, the 
new government reformed the institutional framework, integrating their active labour 
market policies with the benefits system and infrastructure. A new government 
department, the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) was created, and the old 
Employment Service and Benefits Agency were merged to form Jobcentre Plus (Finn, 
2003). And there were reforms to the tax and benefits system, as well as a new National 
Minimum Wage, for the first time in British history, established at least partly with a view 
to making work a more attractive option than life on benefits. In the Autumn of 2009 the 
Flexible New Deal was introduced, extending the time limit before which participants 
were obliged to undertake full-time activity to 18 months and two years, for the 18-25 and 
over 25 ages groups respectively (Gregg, 2009). 
These active measures should be seen in the broader context of a general shift from 
passive to active employment strategies across the European Union at the time. The 
OECD’s ‘Jobs Study’, released in 1994 advocated such measures under a climate of 
persistent high unemployment in several European countries. (OECD, 1994; Finn, 2000). 
Though there were differences in the approaches taken in different countries, obligatory 
interviews between the unemployed person and the employment service was a common 
element in all countries (Daguerre & Etherington, 2009). In Britain the shift was guided 
very much by the ‘rights and responsibilities’ philosophy of New Labour, and focused 
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largely on the individual unemployed person and their behaviour (Finn, 2003) rather than 
on any fundamental shift in thinking on macro-economic policy. The primary aim was to 
improve the employability of the long-term unemployed, preparing them for entry or re-
entry into the labour market (Finn, 2003). The training and support offered was 
accompanied by a stronger element of compulsion than elsewhere in the OECD, and 
Daguerre and Etherington (2009) were able to state that “The United Kingdom (UK) is 
clearly in the top league of countries to place increased pressure on benefit claimants.  
In recent years the UK government has intensified its efforts to activate all people of 
working age, including people on inactive benefits such as incapacity benefits customers 
and lone parents” (p.1). Referring to the four options on offer under the New Deal for 
Young People, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance 
minister) Gordon Brown made it very clear early on that ‘there is no fifth option’ (Fraser, 
2003, p.290). In 2000 Gordon Brown went further, saying (Fraser, 2003) “we will meet 
our responsibility to ensure that there are job opportunities and the chance to learn new 
skills, you must now meet your responsibilities – to earn a wage” (p.290) and in 2001 
David Blunkett, then Secretary of State for Education and Employment issued a warning 
that ‘there is no hiding place’ for the work-shy (Theodore, 2007). Despite this tough talk, 
the UK’s overall spending on active labour market policy remained low by international 
standards, in line with trends across the English-speaking world. In 2005 the UK spent 
0.32% of GDP in active labour market policies, whilst Denmark, Sweden and France 
spent 1.74%, 1.18% and 0.90% respectively (Daguerre & Etherington, 2009).   
There are varying accounts of the underlying intellectual foundation for the New Deal 
schemes as well as differing interpretations of their results. Daguerre has described two 
basic approaches to active labour market policies (ALMPs) across the OECD (Daguerre, 
2004). The ‘human capital approach’ is focused primarily on the acquisition of skills and 
the development of long-term employability and is preponderant in the Scandinavian 
welfare states. The second, ‘work-first’ approach focuses on short-term placement of the 
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unemployed into work, with less regard to quality. Whilst the first approach involves a 
greater degree of voluntary participation in employment programmes, the second entails 
a more coercive regime, and includes schemes that fall under the description of 
‘workfare’ (Daguerre, 2004). Whilst some observers see the New Deals in the context of 
a genuine concern with social exclusion, and based on models borrowed from 
Scandinavian countries, esp. Sweden (Glynn, 1999), others see elements of continuity 
vis à vis Conservative policy and the influence of US policy, in particular the writings of 
the US political scientist Charles Murray, with his emphasis on workfare (Fraser, 2003; 
Prideaux, 2010). This latter group of observers essentially see the term ‘worklessness’ 
used to stigmatize particular groups of people as lazy and unemployable – hence the 
need to coax them into the labour market through a system of incentives and threats, a 
‘carrot and stick’ approach (Theodore, 2007). In reality the British approach appears to 
be based on a combination of these two paradigms, though there does appear to have 
been a shift towards the US approach in the later stages of the rolling out of the New 
Deals, especially after 2001 (Daguerre, 2004), with a greater focus on the ‘work-first’ 
approach and the increased use of compulsion. Reasons given for this shift include a 
shared work-ethic culture, the view in both countries of unemployment as a behavioural 
phenomenon, as well as the structure of the highly flexible and deregulated labour 
markets in the UK and the US (Daguerre, 2004). Nevertheless, the British approach 
does seem to be less ideologically motivated than has been the case in the US 
(Daguerre, 2004) and an analysis of the development and implementation using case 
studies (Finn, 2003) does suggest flexibility and a genuine concern with the needs of 
individual claimants.  
The debate on the success of the schemes has been complex; with the Labour 
Government claiming a resounding success in getting 250,000 young unemployed 
people off the dole queues, and detractors accusing the New Deal of merely ‘churning’ 
claimants back into the benefits system. The task of assessing the success of the Labour 
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government’s employment policies by analyzing the unemployment figures is 
complicated by the fact that they were implemented at a time of rising prosperity – it 
could be argued, and indeed has been argued, that the fall in unemployment was due 
more to this favourable economic climate than to any specific policy initiative. There are 
conflicting estimates as to the actual impact of the New Deal. Finn (2003), in a 
comprehensive analysis of the New Deal, including the use of case studies, has 
suggested that whilst there have been ‘modest improvements in employment outcomes’ 
(p. 721), there has been less success in placing groups defined as the ‘hardest to help’, 
those facing multiple barriers to employment, in unsubsidized jobs, as well as groups in 
areas of persistent high unemployment (Finn, 2003). Gregg (2009) cites research by 
Giacomo De Georgi (2005) and John Van Reenan (2004) which concludes that the New 
Deal for Young People raised outflows from benefits into work by 5 percentage points, 
i.e. a 20% increase, which would imply that the costs of the programme justified the 
expense. 
Besides the perceived focus on the ‘work-first’ as opposed to the ‘human capital’ 
approach, the New Deal programmes have been criticized on a number of fronts. The 
focus on paid work has been seen to under-rate the significance of unpaid caring, with 
Lowe (2005) suggesting an ‘implicit demeaning’ of caring. Moreover the policies, by 
focusing primarily on individual behaviour, did not address broader issues which might 
have helped ease the path of carers into the labour market, such as improved public 
transport, better childcare facilities and flexible working conditions (Lowe, 2005). Besides 
carers, the New Deals were also seen to have neglected the needs of the disabled, 
many of whom remained dependent on the benefits system (Lowe, 2005; Finn, 2003). 
Perhaps the most serious weakness of the New Deal was the focus on supply-side 
measures to improve the employability of job seekers, and the lack of demand-side 
measures. The focus of these initiatives is very much on individual employability and this 
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has been pointed out specifically by commentators such as Nik Theodore (2007) and 
Green & Hasluck (2009).  
Demand-led labour market policies out of favour 
Demand-led labour market policies were generally out of favour during the period in 
which the New Deal initiatives were launched, as job creation programmes in a number 
of countries during the 1970s and 1980s were seen to have failed to achieve their 
desired goals. There are a number of reasons given for this failure. In order to better 
understand these reasons, it would help to define the main categories of undesired 
outcomes of direct job creation strategies. The deadweight effect occurs where the 
unemployed person would have found a job in the regular labour market without the 
scheme, or when a job created with government funding would have been created 
without this support. The displacement effect refers to situations where jobs are created 
at the expense of other workers. Either employers hire people in subsidized jobs at a 
lower cost, at the expense of employees who are laid off, or participants in a government 
programme are able to gain a competitive advantage over rivals, resulting in layoffs at 
non-participating organisations. In the case of the substitution effect jobs are found for 
members of a target group, at the expense of job seekers in other categories. For 
instance a young unemployed person may find a work in a job guarantee scheme that 
would otherwise have gone to an older job seeker. In the sense that the job guarantee 
has opened up the labour market to a group that might otherwise have been excluded, 
the substitution effect is not unambiguously negative (Meager & Evans, 1998). The 
carousel effect occurs when long-term unemployed people alternate between receiving 
benefits and participating in job creation programmes, without any sustainable 
improvement in their employability (Brodsky, 2000). Lastly, there has been concern over 
the lock-in effect of job guarantee schemes, whereby those hired delay the search for an 
opening in the regular job market, and are hence ‘locked’ into a government scheme 
(Gregg, 2009).  
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The 1970s saw the introduction or strengthening of large-scale job creation schemes 
across the OECD, usually in the public sector, and these schemes have come to be 
seen as having failed due to various combinations of the above factors, especially the 
lock-in effect. In Sweden the long-standing ‘Relief Work’ programme, which was 
originally set up in the 1930s, and which provided six months work was assessed in 
studies to have been made less effective by the lock-in effect (Finn & Simmonds, 2003). 
In order to reduce this lock-in effect, and minimize the ‘comfort factor’ of having a job, the 
amount paid to participants in some of these schemes, such as the Contrats Emploi 
Solidarité in France or the Community Programme in the UK was restricted to ‘benefits 
plus’ and the number of hours worked was limited (Finn & Simmonds, 2003). Indeed the 
Community Programme resembled ‘workfare’ in many aspects (Gregg, 2009). The 
programme showed little long-term impact on the job prospects of participants, with 
evidence of the deadweight and substitution effects (Finn & Simmonds, 2003). Gregg 
(2009) quoted research by Barbara Sianese (2002) suggesting that all such programmes 
at the time suffered from the lock-in effect and were therefore ineffective. Gregg (2009) 
went on to quote a study by David Card, who suggested that “public job creation were 
among the least effective programmes in helping people’s future job chances, although 
they did create incomes for the unemployed and some socially useful output”. Most 
large-scale direct job creation schemes were dramatically reduced in scope or wound 
down completely. 
This loss of faith in large-scale job creation schemes was confirmed and reinforced by 
the OECD in its 1994 Jobs Study, which accepted the need for active labour market 
policies, whilst rejecting demand-led programmes. The report concluded that (OECD 
Jobs Study, 1994): “… their impact has often been disappointing: many subsidized hires 
would have taken place anyway, without the subsidy; or hiring occurred only at the 
expense of other, unsubsidized workers” (p. 37). This conclusion had an important 
impact on thinking regarding labour market policy in the UK and is quoted in all research 
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on the development of employment strategies. Graeme Cooke, a former government 
advisor, also cited this report1 as one explanatory factor behind initial official skepticism 
about the idea of a job guarantee scheme. The report does however proceed to qualify 
this rejection of direct job creation (OECD Jobs Study, 1994) “Targeting job creation to 
particular groups can produce better outcomes for programme participants and for 
society as a whole. In general, young people and the long-term unemployed are the best 
targets” (p. 37). John Martin (1998), in a later OECD report is even more categorical in 
his rejection of direct job creation by the public sector. He states that (Martin, 1998) “this 
measure has been of little success in helping unemployed people get permanent jobs in 
the open labour market…” and that “jobs created in this way have a low marginal 
product” (p.21).  
Demand-led policies revisited 
In a paper for the Monthly Labor Review, Melvin Brodsky (2000), at the time OECD 
coordinator with the US Department of Labor, echoed this assessment of national job 
creation programmes, citing the effects described above, the lack of sufficient 
marketable skills learnt by participants and the poor results (Brodsky, 2000). However, 
Brodsky’s approach was more nuanced, and he described changes which had been 
made to job creation schemes in numerous countries since the 1994 OECD Jobs Study 
research would have been conducted, and which served to improve the effectiveness of 
the schemes. In his paper he went on to describe improvements that were made to 
demand-led, public-service employment programmes and the increased effectiveness 
that has resulted. He covered changes that were implemented in Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, 
where Relief Works was replaced by new programmes, including the Employment 
Development Programme (or ALU, in Swedish), which involved a greater emphasis on 
training and job search, and greater involvement of local government and civil society 
organisations (Brodsky, 2000). The greater emphasis on skills development and job-
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search while a person is participating in a programme, as well as a focus on individual 
needs and local labour-market conditions, are features common to all of these revamped 
job creation schemes (Brodsky, 2000). 
A key part of this overall shift in government job creation schemes is the increased use 
of Intermediate Labour Markets (ILMs), smaller community-based schemes to provide 
transitional employment. ILMs (or Transitional Employment Programs in the USA) have 
functioned both as entirely home-grown local projects to help target groups in specific 
localities, and as part of broader national programmes. Brodsky concludes that (Brodsky, 
2000) “…they have been highly effective in selecting and training disadvantaged workers 
and then integrating them into the regular labour market” (p. 38). Moreover, Brodsky 
highlights the important role of social enterprises in a large proportion of ILMs. There 
appears to be some confusion over the precise definition of ILMs and the term tends to 
cover different types of programme. For our purposes we will use the definition as set out 
by Finn & Simmonds (2003): “…a diverse range of initiatives that typically provide 
temporary waged employment in a genuine work environment with continuous support to 
assist the transition to work.” Furthermore, ILMs are “…local initiatives …where there is a 
direct social benefit from the work” (Finn & Simmonds 2003, p. I). Thus we refer to ILMs 
as a specific type of programme, although large-scale schemes might incorporate such 
local projects or share some of their features, and ILMs are frequently funded within the 
overall context of government programmes (such as the New Deal in the UK).  
Intermediate Labour Markets – the UK experience 
Finn & Simmonds (2003) conducted an extensive review of ILMs in Britain, with 
international comparisons, and concluded that these projects have the potential to be 
successful provided that certain conditions are met. The best placed schemes deliver 
waged jobs that are ‘close to the regular labour market’, i.e. work that is similar to work 
that participants might be expected to find elsewhere (since such opportunities represent 
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the best preparation), involve an element of job search and skills development, and are 
targeted at the most disadvantaged groups. They also conclude that the evidence 
weighs in favour of smaller rather than larger schemes and that compulsory participation 
reduces the deadweight effect (Finn & Simmonds, 2003). They estimate that in 2002/3 
approximately 14,000 people participated in ILMs in the United Kingdom – a significant 
number, though not constituting a widespread national phenomenon. Other writers have 
also commended ILMs. For instance Meager & Evans (1998) concur that such schemes 
offer work that is ‘close’ to that of regular jobs in the broader economy and consequently 
a better preparation for a transition into regular employment. Moreover they add that 
ILMs tend to be less costly than traditional job creation schemes, generate ‘positive 
externalities’ in terms of social benefits and local income multipliers, and generate less of 
a stigma (Meager & Evans, 1998). They cite extensive survey data from numerous 
countries to support the claim that such schemes are more effective a means of 
transition into regular work than other active labour market measures, though they 
express reservations about the transferability of ILMs to a large, national, scale.   
Gregg (2008), in his report for the Department for Work & Pensions, concluded that ILMs 
are successful in providing the preparation necessary to integrate or re-integrate people 
into the mainstream labour market, and argued for an increased focus on this sector in 
government policy making, recommending that the government integrate this approach 
into its labour market policies and make efforts to build the social enterprise sector.  
In a later paper Gregg (2009) once again highlighted the role of ILMs, representing what 
in his view constituted a small but viable network of support for the long-term 
unemployed. He points out the parallel aims of many ILMs to support local regeneration 
and to bolster the social economy, creating yet more jobs in the process. Gregg also 
pointed out that, in contrast to the New Deal schemes, job seeking assistance is 
provided during the placements, not ahead of them, and he also suggested that job entry 
and retention rates of ILMs were superior to those of larger mainstream programmes 
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(Gregg, 2009). It would appear that the best way of preparing people for the labour 
market is to actually give them a job. It should be stressed here that this approach differs 
fundamentally from workfare since the jobs in consideration are ‘real’ jobs, often 
unionized, paying real salaries, as opposed to ‘benefits plus’ schemes. 
One of the oldest and most high profile ILM schemes in the UK is the Wise Group, which 
is specifically mentioned in the Gregg report (Gregg, 2008). The Wise Group is a social 
enterprise that was established in Glasgow in 1983 to provide home insulation and other 
energy saving services and at the same time to provide work for the unemployed at a 
time of high unemployment. The organisation is still headquartered in Glasgow but has 
activities in a total of 24 locations across Scotland and the north of England and has 
provided employment opportunities for approximately 28,000 people during its existence. 
The group’s activities remain focused on energy efficiency and the home, alongside a 
range of other environmental services (Wise Group, 2010).  
It should at this stage be made clear that ILMs were not originally put together with a 
view to providing a universal job guarantee, or to form part of an ‘employer of last resort’ 
programme. These schemes were mainly focused on small localities, and often also 
addressed broad local social issues. Finn & Simmonds, (2003) highlight the focus on 
improving individual employability rather than strategic job creation. The case is being 
made here that ILMs have a solid track record in improving the employment situation 
whilst avoiding the inefficiencies of larger-scale programmes. It is also claimed, that 
whilst evidence shows that ILM-type schemes work best for the most disadvantaged 
groups, this model provides an effective means of providing work for all long-term 
unemployed people in times of economic contraction, since it avoids many of the 
negative side effects of earlier schemes. As Stephen Syrett (2008) puts it: 
More successful interventions are characterized by: a strong evidence base and 
local intelligence which enables an understanding of the workings of the local 
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labour market, barriers faced by different groups, and the differing aspirations and 
motivations of those not economically active; a plan of what needs to be done 
locally with the role of different agencies in achieving this clearly set out; 
mechanisms for actively linking workless people to job opportunities: i.e. through 
developing appropriate sector specific programmes (e.g. construction, hospitality, 
retailing etc.) or spatially linking residents of deprived neighbourhoods with 
nearby sites of employment growth. (p.5) 
 These positive characteristics have made ILMs an important building block in broader 
job guarantee programmes such as the Future Jobs Fund. 
The StepUP programme 
The first major attempt to harness the potential of ILMs in government policy making was 
the StepUP programme, a pilot scheme implemented between April 2002 and December 
2004 (Bivand, Brooke, Jenkins & Simmonds, 2006). The scheme was implemented in 20 
pilot areas and was open to people in the 18-50 age bracket who were still unemployed 
six months after completing the New Deal options. Such individuals in the relevant areas 
were then referred to an advisor and offered job opportunities paid at the national 
minimum wage. Jobs offered under StepUP lasted up to 50 weeks and towards the end 
of the placement clients were given job-search support and a reference from their 
employer (Bivand et al., 2006). For each of the StepUP areas an independent ‘Managing 
Agent’ was appointed, charged with running the programme and in particular, with 
sourcing jobs in the public, private or non-profit sectors. The job provided was for 33 
hours per week, less than full time, in order to provide time for job-search activity (Bivand 
et al., 2006). Of a total of 5,678 who became eligible to participate in the programme, 
3,032 people actually took up StepUP jobs. The cost per participant of StepUP was 
£9,300 (Bivand et al. 2006). 
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A report was carried out in 2006 by Bivand, Brooke, Jenkins and Simmonds (Bivand et 
al.) for the Department for Work & Pensions in which the results of the StepUP 
programme were evaluated in detail. This report does not find any clear reasons for the 
relatively low level of participation in the programme, though a number of trends were 
identified. The researchers also measured the success of the scheme in terms of 
whether the participants had ‘successful job outcomes’ after completion of StepUP. A 
‘successful job outcome’ was measured by whether the participant was in paid 
employment in the 90 days following completion (Bivand et al., 2006), and outcomes 
were measured in relation to control groups. The report finds that the overall impact of 
the programme was modest though not statistically significant. However, this changes 
when the impact on different age groups is considered. There are improvements of 8.5% 
and 3.4% in outcomes (compared with controls) for the 30-49 and 25-29 age groups 
respectively. Moreover, StepUP had the greatest impact for those who had the greatest 
disadvantage in terms of employability. The report distinguishes between subjective 
employability, including criteria related to the individual’s mindset, and objective 
employability, relating to such factors as qualifications, skills and experience – and those 
with high subjective employability and low objective employability showed a 23.3% 
improvement.  StepUP was of significant help to those furthest removed from the 
mainstream labour market, and of marginal or negative importance to those close to the 
labour market. In particular there was a small negative impact for the 18-24 age group 
(Bivand et al., 2006). Overall, the conclusion is that there was insufficient emphasis on 
job search during the entire process, and that an improvement in this aspect would have 
led to improved results all around. In addition the report claims that the managing agents 
were insufficiently incentivized to deliver adequate job search. Combined with this 
shortcoming, the 50-week time period of StepUP placements would have led to the ‘lock-
in’ effect (Bivand et al., 2006). The report concludes that those with the greatest barriers 
to finding a job in the regular labour markets are appropriate targets for a job guarantee 
scheme, whereas for young people (Bivand et al. 2006) “…evidence would suggest that 
19 
Future Jobs Fund 
an enhanced New Deal, consisting of increased personal support and additional 
jobsearch requirements, might be as effective as a guaranteed job” (p.6). This view was 
not universally shared. Gregg (2009) concedes that the effectiveness of StepUP might 
have been reduced by the lock in effect, but suggests that this risk could be reduced by 
better design, and the incorporation of well thought-out other activities into the 
programme, such as relevant training and job search assistance. Gregg also 
recommends more attention in the selection of private sector employers participating in 
job guarantee schemes.   
The current recession – a major policy shift 
The beginning of the recession following the latest financial crisis marks a shift in the 
thinking of the Labour government towards demand-led growth strategies. The Gregg 
Report, released in late 2008, as discussed above, advocates the use of ILM-type 
programmes to support job creation. During 2009, in a number of policy notes, Paul 
Gregg and Richard Layard advocated a job guarantee scheme, which they wanted to call 
exactly that: ”The Job Guarantee” (Gregg & Layard, 2009 p.1). They argued that since 
those experiencing unemployment for a long period of time become difficult to place, it is 
hard to ensure a speedy inflation-free recovery, therefore it is preferable to avoid long-
term unemployment. Moreover, the coercive regime in which there is pressure for benefit 
recipients to take on jobs is harder to maintain in a climate of high unemployment and 
scarcity of work opportunities. Most importantly they argued the case from the 
perspective of human values (Gregg & Layard): “Inactivity breeds misery and despair. 
Common humanity requires us to offer meaningful activity when the regular economy 
does not. We must make it clear that, whatever happens, there will be a job within a 
reasonable period” (p.1). They outlined four benefits of a job guarantee scheme, namely 
the benefit created by the work done, the ‘psychic well-being’ of those hired, the 
‘prevention of long-term unemployment’ and the economic stimulus effect of increased 
incomes for people with a high marginal propensity to consume (Gregg & Layard, 2009, 
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p.3/4). Although the government did take up their advice, the job guarantee announced 
was only for young people. In an interview with the author, Graeme Cooke, who was 
Expert Advisor (2008-2009) to James Purnell, the then Secretary of State for Work & 
Pensions, explained that there was a strong wish on the part of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Prime Minister to focus scarce resources on young people1. In a later 
note in October 2009, Layard (2009) argued the guarantee should be extended to cover 
all people, that everyone should be guaranteed the offer of work within a year. This is 
clearly a considerable move from supporting a small-scale network of ILMs helping the 
most severely disadvantaged, towards recognition of the need for government to act as 
‘employer of last resort’, albeit leveraging the capacity of smaller locally-based job 
creation programmes. 
Graeme Cooke1 explained that there was a very clear policy intention to move to a 
demand-led strategy, as with the onset of the recession this was seen as being where 
the basic problem lay. There was a conscious desire not to offer simply an extension of 
the New Deal policies. It seems that the determination of ministers and their advisors as 
well as support from Paul Gregg and Richard Layard to push for a demand-led jobs 
strategy was sufficient to overcome institutional opposition based on the failure of direct 
job creation schemes in the 1970s and 1980s and the perceived shortcomings of 
StepUP. The view of the decision-makers was that it was necessary not to reject 
demand-led schemes, but to learn lessons from past failures and to design a better 
scheme1. Cooke also confirmed that the intellectual underpinning for this policy shift 
came from Hyman Minsky, who advocated the state’s role as ‘employer of last resort’ 
(Minsky, 1986). There was also desire to avoid old-style Keynesian public works 
projects, which were seen as expensive and poorly targeted1. And in an article in the 
Financial Times on 4 December 2009, James Purnell and Graeme Cooke, who had by 
then both left government, advocated a job guarantee for everyone, within the framework 
of overall welfare reform (Cooke & Purnell, 2009): “This is the final piece of the puzzle of 
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welfare reform” (2009). In a subsequent report published by the think tank Demos in 
early 2010, they again call for an ‘employer of last resort’ policy, and the extension of the 
Young Person’s Guarantee to cover all unemployed people, with explicit reference to 
Minsky (Cooke & Purnell, 2010). Indeed Cooke1 confirmed that a lack of financial 
resources was the primary obstacle to a job guarantee for all age groups - and the 
Labour Party did indeed commit to extending the Young Person’s Guarantee in its 2010 
election manifesto.  
In terms of the design of the scheme, there appears to have been agreement amongst 
key policy makers that the jobs created by any government job guarantee scheme had to 
be as close to jobs in the mainstream labour market as possible. Gregg (2009) stressed 
that the future employers of participants would need to see “relevant experience, a good 
reference, evidence of good work habits and self motivation” and argued that jobs 
created should provide these, including the usual discipline and threat of dismissal 
common to jobs in the regular labour market. This also means that the jobs should pay a 
wage. Gregg & Layard (2009) again emphasized this point, that participants should be 
paid the “rate for the job” (p. 2) in order for these jobs to be seen as real jobs, as 
opposed to a variant of workfare. Cooke1 also explained the importance of having jobs 
paid at the National Minimum Wage, with participants entitled to join trade unions, as 
being vital to the scheme, not least to avoid the substitution effect and the obviation of 
collective bargaining agreements. The jobs created were to offer at least 25 hours per 
week of work, so that they would feel like full-time jobs, whilst still allowing time for job 
search, another important element in the scheme. Gregg & Layard (2009, p.2) also 
underlined the importance of jobs that provided some social benefit, suggesting that 
participants could be employed undertaking important “low-tech maintenance” work on 
“public housing, schools, hospitals and roads” requiring very little initial training (with 
professional supervision) as well as work in the field of social care. There was also a 
resistance to the idea of using private contractors and, as we shall see, the model 
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chosen was a centrally administered fund to which local organisations and consortia 
could bid, with a key role for the Jobcentre Plus agency. Gregg & Layard (2009) 
estimated the total cost of a job guarantee that would apply to people in the 18-25 and 
25 plus age brackets after 12 and 18 months out of work respectively. The estimate is 
based on the assumption that the jobs are paid at the National Minimum Wage, for 30 
hours per week, and that job placements are for six months. They estimate that the total 
cost (taking into account that there would be savings on benefits not paid) would be 
around £2.45 billion (Gregg & Layard, 2009).  
The Trades Union Congress (TUC), Britain’s umbrella trade union organisation, was also 
supportive, having called for such a scheme in their pre-budget submission in 2009, 
especially for young people. The TUC were included in discussions with the government 
on union involvement in the process and also took part in assessment panels for bids. 
The TUC were concerned about the displacement and substitution effects and the risk 
that the scheme would end up undermining the pay and conditions of existing workers, 
although there was strong support for the idea of a job guarantee. And whilst in general 
the TUC had reservations about the operation of sanctions against claimants, it was felt 
that since what was on offer involved real jobs, there was no problem with sanctions 
faced by people who turned them down (Exell, 2010). Gregg & Layard (2009) also 
supported the “activation approach, in which after some point it becomes impossible to 
receive support except through activity” (p.1), citing the success of this stance in 
reducing unemployment in Denmark and the Netherlands. This mandatory element was 
also strongly supported by Cooke1. 
In the process of designing the job guarantee scheme, policy makers examined the 
Australian Jobs Fund, which was created not long before its British equivalent, and which 
shares some common features. The Jobs Fund is an AUD 650 million fund administered 
by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations and three other 
government departments to invest in capital projects and to provide seed financing for 
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capital projects, with a view to stimulating the creation of new jobs during a period of 
recession (DEEWR, 2009a). The Jobs Fund started its activities on 1 July 2009 and will 
continue to make grants of up to AUD 2 million apiece until 30 June 2011 (DEEWR, 
2009b). The Jobs Fund has three parts, with AUD 300 million allocated for community 
infrastructure projects, especially in the fields of environmentally-friendly technology and 
the preservation of heritage, AUD 200 million allocated for self-sustaining social 
enterprises and a further AUD 150 million for ‘bricks and mortar’ infrastructure  projects 
such as renovation and refurbishment. Key criteria included the creation of jobs and the 
development of skills, and successful bids had to show that projects were in areas hit by 
unemployment, ready to start and sustainable (DEEWR, 2009a). 
The Future Jobs Fund 
The Young Person’s Guarantee (“YPG”) was announced by the then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Alistair Darling (2009) in the House of Commons on 22 April in his Budget 
Speech:  
I am also determined that we do even more to protect young people from the 
damaging impact of long-term unemployment. The alternative is a return to the 
days when a whole generation of young people found themselves abandoned to 
a future on the scrap heap. We will not repeat that mistake. So I want to offer a 
guarantee. From January, everyone under the age of 25 who has been out of 
work for 12 months will be offered a job or a place in training. Those in work will 
receive a wage; those in training will receive additional money on top of their 
benefits. To provide these extra opportunities, we are working with employers to 
create or support as many as 250,000 jobs. That will include delivering local 
services and traineeships in social care and other high-demand sectors, as well 
as jobs for people of all ages in particularly badly hit communities. 
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 The aim of the YPG, the details of which were supplied by the Department for Work & 
Pensions on the day of the Budget speech, was to ensure that all those under the age of 
25 (i.e. 18-24 year olds) unemployed for twelve months or longer would be guaranteed a 
job, the opportunity of work experience or work-focused training. The scheme was to 
start on 25 January 2010 and be in operation until March 2011 (Harari, 2009). The most 
important part of the YPG was the Future Jobs Fund (FJF), a £1 billion fund which was 
to provide up to 150,000 guaranteed jobs, 100,000 of which were to be targeted at the 
18-24 age group. The remaining 50,000 jobs were to be targeted at all age groups in 
unemployment ‘hotspots’ (DWP, 2009a), defined as areas where the rate of 
unemployment is more than 1.5 percentage points above the national average -the 
unemployment rate being measured as the number of people claiming the Jobseekers 
Allowance (DWP, 2009b). The government also stated its wish for at least 10,000 and 
15,000 of the jobs to be green jobs and jobs in social enterprises respectively (DWP, 
2009a). A ‘green job’ is, for the purposes of this scheme, defined as “one that provides a 
good or service that helps move in the economy to lower carbon emissions and greater 
resource efficiency” (DWP, 2009b). The scheme was extended, first in September 2009 
to cover those young people between the ages of 18 and 24 unemployed for 10 months 
or more, and then in December 2009, in the White Paper Building Britain’s Recovery: 
Achieving Full Employment, to all those, in the same age bracket, unemployed for six 
months (DWP, 2009c). Besides jobs provided by the FJF, long-term unemployed young 
people were offered three other options: Sectoral Routes, which involved training in 
specific sectors with employer support (the sectors were those where there was growing 
employment), participation on a Community Task Force (which involved work experience 
placements), and regular apprenticeships (Gregg, 2009). As from April 2010, all those in 
the 18-24 age bracket unemployed for over 10 months were required to take one of 
these options (Harari, 2009). And the Labour Party pledged, in its manifesto for the 2010 
General Election, to extend the job guarantee for all people unemployed for over two 
years (Labour Party, 2010, p.19). 
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The Future Jobs Fund was administered centrally by the Department for Work & 
Pensions (DWP), in cooperation with the Department of Communities and Local 
Government, with the first jobs being offered in October 2009 (DWP, 2009a).  
Organisations were invited to bid for grant funding in order to support the creation of 
jobs. A maximum of £6500 was available for each job provided, though it was possible to 
bid for lower amounts. Bids were assessed on a rolling monthly cycle as they were 
received by the DWP – first an initial screening was carried out to confirm that bids had 
passed the minimum criteria, and then more detailed assessments were carried out by 
regional panels based on the qualitative criteria, which are described below (DWP, 
2009a). The government’s aim was to inform bidders of the success or otherwise of their 
applications within six weeks of the end of the month in which they were submitted. The 
DWP also provided a list of contacts in regional government offices in order to provide 
advice for potential bidders, and undertook to provide feedback to bidders whose bids 
passed the minimum criteria but were not accepted, with a view to resubmission (DWP, 
2009a). Moreover, the DWP reserved the right to accept selected parts of bids (DWP, 
2009b).  Successful bidders (or lead bidders, in the case of joint bids) then entered into a 
formal agreement with the DWP, which set out the terms of the government grant that 
was being made. The local branches of the Jobcentre Plus government employment 
service were responsible for referring potential candidates to employers under this 
scheme. Employers retained the right to reject candidates, but were required to provide 
feedback (DWP, 2009a).  
The government outlined the following minimum criteria for bids to be considered for 
funding (DWP, 2009b):  
“…all created jobs must: 
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• Be additional jobs, lasting at least 6 months for each individual, either for long 
term unemployed young people or in unemployment hotspots. 
• Deliver work that benefits local communities; 
• Include support for employees to move into long-term sustained 
employment.” 
The first condition, that of ‘additionality’, was carefully defined to ensure that the jobs 
created were genuinely new, and would not have existed without the FJF. “Jobs must not 
replace existing jobs or vacancies and must not lead to another individual (i.e. an 
employee or contractor) losing their job or reducing their wage rates or hours of paid 
employment.” (DWP, 2009b).  In addition to providing jobs for at least six months, 
bidders were expected to commit to offering 25 hours per week of work, paid at the 
national minimum wage or more. The government expected bidders to have consulted 
trade unions as regards appropriate wage rates (DWP, 2009b). Moreover, bids needed 
to be in full compliance with all applicable legislation, and to demonstrate value for 
money (DWP, 2009b).  
Once bids were deemed to have passed the minimum criteria, they were then assessed, 
as described above, by a number of ‘qualitative’ criteria, including the appropriateness of 
the proposed project to the local labour market conditions, and the support provided to 
employees, in particular in terms of their ongoing employability. In addition, bids were 
expected to deliver clearly defined benefits to the local community that exceeded the 
benefits of providing the jobs, and bidders needed to demonstrate the capability to 
execute proposed projects (DWP, 2009a).  
Although there was an expectation that the larger share of bids would come from local 
government (DWP, 2009a), it was hoped that there would be strong participation on the 
part of the non-profit and private sectors. The government expressed a ‘strong 
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preference’ for partnership bids, and it was made clear that bids for projects involving the 
creation of less than 30 new jobs were unlikely to be accepted. However, for smaller 
organisations, the government offered support in terms of helping to identify potential 
partners for joint bid submissions (DWP, 2009b).  
According to information published on the website of the DWP, bids were approved for 
318 different organisations between July 2009 and February 2010, involving up to 
86,785 jobs (DWP, 2010a). Information has not been made available about bids 
accepted from March 2010 till the closure of the scheme in May 2010. According to 
statistics released by the Office of National Statistics on 13 October 2010, a total of 
54,920 new jobs had actually begun by this date under the scheme. New job starts will 
continue to take place, under bids already accepted, until March 2011 (DWP, 2010b). 
The total number of placements of all types, including work experience and training, 
started under the Young Person’s Guarantee is 88,060 as of 13 October 2010. Therefore 
the FJF represents some 62.4% of all placements under the guarantee (DWP, 2010b). 
Furthermore the Department for Work & Pensions estimates that over 100,000 jobs will 
have been funded over the life of the scheme (DWP, 2010a). 
Conclusion 
The Future Jobs Fund was scrapped in May 2010 after the current Conservative-led 
coalition government took office. Nevertheless, the initiative represents a significant shift 
in thinking in British employment policy, establishing the concept of the state acting as an 
‘employer of last resort’. With unemployment set to remain high for some years to come, 
there is scope for reviving the idea of a job guarantee, starting with young people and 
then becoming more universal. The Future Jobs Fund, and the careful thought that went 
into crafting it, represents the latest stage in the development of thinking on job 
guarantee schemes, and though the scheme was not in operation long enough to make 
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a definitive judgment on its success, it should serve as a useful starting point for a future 
policy commitment to full employment.  
Notes:  
1. Personal interview with Graeme Cooke (from 2008-2009, Expert Advisor to 
James Purnell, Secretary of State for Work & Pensions): London, 1 April 2010. 
  
29 
Future Jobs Fund 
References 
Beveridge, William H. (1944). Full Employment in a Free Society. London: George 
Allen & Unwin. 
Bivand, P., Brooke, B., Jenkins, S., Simmonds, D. (2006). Evaluation of StepUP 
Pilot: Final Report. Research Report No. 337. Department for Work and 
Pensions. Available: http://campaigns.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2005-
2006/rrep337.pdf [April 2006]. 
Cooke, G. & Purnell, J. (2009, December 4). Every one of us should be guaranteed a 
job. Financial Times. 
Cooke, G. & Purnell, J. (2010). Introduction. In Cooke, G. & Purnell, J. (Ed.). We 
Mean Power: Ideas for the Future of the Left (pp. 15-49). London: Demos.  
Daguerre, A. (2004). Importing Workfare: Policy Transfer of Social and Labour 
Market Policies from the USA to Britain under New Labour. Social Policy & 
Administration. Vol.38, No. 1. 41-56. 
Daguerre, A. & Etherington, D. (2009). Active Labour Market Policies in International 
Context: What Works Best? Lessons for the UK. Department for Work and 
Pensions, Working Paper No. 59. Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. Available: 
http://campaigns.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/WP59.pdf 
Darling, Alistair (2009). 2009 Budget Speech. As reported in Hansard – House of 
Commons Debates, 22 April 2009, Columns 240/1. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090422/deb
text/90422-0004.htm 
30 
Future Jobs Fund 
De Giorgi, G. (2005). Long-term effects of a mandatory multistage program: the New 
Deal for Young People in the UK. Institute for Fiscal Studies. Working Paper 
0508. 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR). (2009a). 
Jobs Fund Fact Sheet. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.deewr.gov.au/Employment/Documents/factsheet.pdf [Retrieved: 
12 October 2010] 
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR). (2009b). 
Frequently Asked Questions – Jobs Fund. [Online]. Available : 
http://www.deewr.gov.au/Employment/Documents/JobsFundFAQ.pdf 
[Retrieved: 12 October 2010] 
Department for Work & Pensions (DWP). (2009a). Guide to the Future Jobs Fund. 
[Online]. Available : 
http://campaigns.dwp.gov.uk/campaigns/futurejobsfund/pdf/fjf-guide.pdf 
[Retrieved: 12 July 2010] 
Department for Work & Pensions (DWP). (2009b). Future Jobs Fund Bid: Guidance 
Notes. [Online]. Available : 
http://campaigns.dwp.gov.uk/campaigns/futurejobsfund/pdf/fjf-bid-guide-
notes.pdf [Retrieved: 12 July 2010] 
Department for Work & Pensions (DWP). (2009c). Building Britain’s Recovery: 
Achieving Full Employment. (Government White Paper.) London: The 
Stationary Office. 
Department for Work & Pensions (DWP). (2010a). Future Jobs Fund. [Online]. 
Available : http://campaigns.dwp.gov.uk/campaigns/futurejobsfund/index.asp 
[Retrieved: 12 July 2010]  
31 
Future Jobs Fund 
Department for Work & Pensions (DWP). (2010b). Young Person’s Guarantee 
Official Statistics.  [Online]. Available: 
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/jsa/ypg/ypg_oct2010.pdf [Retrieved: 6 
November 2010]. 
Exell, R., Senior Policy Officer, TUC. (28 June 2010). Future Jobs Fund. E-mail to 
Tanweer Ali (tanweer27@gmail.com). 
Finn, D. (2001). Modernisation or Workfare ? New Labour’s Work-Based Welfare 
State. Competition & Change. 5. 355-374. 
Finn, D. (2003). The “Employment First” Welfare State: Lessons from the New Deal 
for Young People. Social Policy & Administration. Vol.37, No. 7. 709-723. 
Finn, D. & Simmonds, D. (2003). Intermediate Labour Markets in Britain and an 
International Review of Transitional Employment Programmes. Department 
for Work and Pensions Report No. 173. Available: 
http://campaigns.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/working_age/wa2003/173rep.pdf 
Foot, Michael (1984). Another Heart and Other Pulses. Glasgow: William Collins 
Sons & Co.  
Fraser, D. (2003). The Evolution of the British Welfare State (3rd Ed.). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Glynn, S. (1999). Employment, Unemployment and the Labour Market. In Page, R.M. 
& Silburn, R. (Ed.) British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century. (pp. 179-
198). London: Macmillan Press.  
Green, A.E. & Hasluck, C. (2009). Action to Reduce Worklessness: What Works? 
Local Economy. Vol. 24, No. 1. 28-37. 
32 
Future Jobs Fund 
Gregg, P. (2008). Realising Potential : A Vision for Personalised Conditionality and 
Support. An Independent report to the Department for Work and Pensions. 
Norwich: The Stationary Office. 
Gregg, P. (2009). Job Guarantee: Evidence and Design. Bristol: Centre for Market & 
Public Organisation, University of Bristol [Online]. Available: 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/other/jobguarantee.pdf 
Gregg, P. & Layard, R. (2009). A Job Guarantee. Centre for Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics. Available: 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/textonly/_new/staff/layard/pdf/001JGProposal-16-03-
09.pdf [16 March 2009]. 
Harari, Daniel (2010). Young Person’s Guarantee. Standard note SN/EP/5352. 
House of Commons Library, Economic Policy and Statistics Section. 
Labour Party. (2010). The Labour Party Manifesto 2010: A Future Fair for All. 
[Online]. Available : http://www.labour.org.uk/manifesto-splash [Retrieved: 12 
July 2010] 
Layard, R. (2009). Note on unemployment policy and the crisis. Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics. Available: 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/textonly/_new/staff/layard/pdf/Note_unemployment_crisis_
IZAOct09.pdf [20 October 2009]. 
Lowe, R. (2005). The Welfare State in Britain since 1945. (3rd Ed.). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Martin, John (1998). What Works among Active Labour Market Policies: Evidence 
from OECD Countries’ Experiences. Labour Market & Social Policy – 
Occasional Papers. No. 35. Paris: OECD.  
33 
Future Jobs Fund 
Meager, N. & Evans, C. (1998). The Evaluation of Active Labour Market Measures 
for the Long-term Unemployed. Employment and Training Papers 16. 
Geneva: International Labour Office.  
Minsky, H. (1986). Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (2008 edition).McGraw Hill, NY. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development. (1994). The OECD Jobs 
Study: Evidence and Explanation. Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation & Development. 
Prideaux, S.J. (2010). The Welfare Policies of Charles Murray are Alive and Well in 
the UK. International Journal of Social Welfare. Vol. 9, Issue 3. 293-302. 
Richards, Paul (2009). Labour Must Act Now on Unemployment. In Progress Online 
[Online]. Available: http://progressonline.org.uk/columns/column.asp?c=252 
[17 July 2009]. 
Sianesi, B. (2002). Differential effects of Swedish Active Labour Market Programmes 
for Unemployed Adults During the 1990s. Institute for Fiscal Studies. Working 
Paper 0125. 
Syrett, S. (2008). Reducing Worklessness : The Role of Local Action and Local 
Economic Development. Liverpool: John Moores University, European 
Institute for Urban Affairs [Online]. Available. 
http://www.ljmu.ac.uk/EIUA/EIUA_Docs/9_Syrett.pdf. 
Theodore, N. (2007). New Labour at Work: Long-term Unemployment and the 
Geography of Opportunity. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 31. 927-939. 
Van Reenen, J. (2004). Active Labour Market Policies and the British New Deal for 
Unemployed Youth in Context. In Blundell, R., Card, D. & Freeman, R. (Eds). 
Seeking a Premier Economy. University of Chicago Press. 
34 
Future Jobs Fund 
Wickham-Jones, Mark (2001). Missed Opportunities: British Social Democracy and 
the Rehn Model, 1951-1964. In Milner H. & Wadensjö, E. (Ed.) Gösta Rehn, 
the Swedish Model and Labour Market Policies: International and national 
perspectives (Chapter 14). Ashgate, UK: Ashgate Publishing. 
Wise Group website [Online]. Available: http://www.thewisegroup.co.uk/content/. 
[Retrieval]: 22 November 2010. 
 
 
